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Christians and Pagans in the Sacred
Nation

CHRISTOPHER J. EBERLE*

I.
Steve Smith’s Pagans and Christians in the City1 is an unusual book: it
relies on a heavy dose of ancient history as an aid to illuminating the
present. His discussions of Roman religion, culture and politics, the place of
Christianity therein, and the conflicts engendered thereby are fascinating in and
of themselves—and the author clearly relishes discussing them. Smith’s
continued movement between conflicts in classical Rome and contemporary
United States is suggestive and illuminating: Pagans and Christians in the
City is, at the very least, a most fascinating read. But it incorporates a
quite unusual mode of argument and so I think it is easy to misunderstand
its central claims. So, my first goal will be to specify what I take to be the
main aim, and to a considerable degree, the main achievement, of Pagans
and Christians in the City.
II.
I understand Smith to be engaging in a species of cultural criticism and
social analysis with the aim of helping the reader better understand what
is really driving a variety of apparently disparate or loosely connected
*
© 2019 Christopher J. Eberle. Professor of Philosophy at the United States
Naval Academy. I thank Steve Smith and Larry Alexander for their invitation to attend a
conference on Steve’s Pagans and Christians in the City. My thanks as well to Bridget
Balisy and Macklin Thornton for their most excellent editorial help.
1. STEVEN D. SMITH, PAGANS AND CHRISTIANS IN THE CITY: CULTURE WARS FROM THE
TIBER TO THE POTOMAC (2018).
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conflicts in the United States today. We experience emotionally laden
disagreements about the placement of crosses in public spaces, the
punishment of bakers who refuse to provide specialty cakes for gay weddings,
the justification of state policies by appeal to religious reasons, the
conscription of nuns to provide insurance policies that cover contraception,
and the like. I take Smith to be providing us with his favored way of
understanding what these various cultural conflicts are really about—or
what they are also really about.2 Broadly put, Smith thinks that we are
undergoing a religious conflict—one which has a very long, though often
submerged, history—between those who privilege a transcendent sacred
and those who privilege an immanent sacred.3 This religious conflict takes
the specific form of “counterrevolution,” where modern pagans intend to
overthrow the cultural, legal, and political hegemony that transcendent
religions like Christianity and Judaism have long enjoyed in the United
States and aspire to establish a competing hegemony that privileges the
“immanent” sacred.4
Central to this counterrevolutionary religious conflict are a whole spread
of symbolic battles. These symbolic battles have such a strong emotional
resonance partly because they help define the political community to which
we belong. As with any nation-state, the United States is an imagined
community; we are bound together as a political community by the way
in which we construe our communal bonds, and the way we construe
those bonds is powerfully shaped by various symbolic, liturgical acts—
pledging allegiance to “one nation under God,” kneeling during the national
anthem, dipping the American flag to a cross, and waterboarding suspected
terrorists.5 Acts of this sort communicate something about what unites us
into one political community. These acts help to specify who does and does
not count as ‘genuinely’ American, and thus they have an emotional salience
that far outstrips the more mundane stuff of politics—reforming the tax
system, establishing building codes, funding cancer research, and the like.
2. Disagreements of the sort on which Smith focuses are never really about only
one thing, particularly because they involve many diversely committed people. Nor must
the parties to those disagreements be aware of all their disagreements. Indeed, they might
be unaware of the most important aspects of what divides them: one party might think the
disagreement is about fair access to pizza, but the conflict might really be, or also really
be, a theological dispute about divine authority over our lives. One of Smith’s goals, I take it,
is to induce in us an awareness of the hidden religious dimensions of the disagreements
that fall under the broad category of “the culture wars.” In this respect, Smith’s book is
thoroughly, and unsurprisingly, Augustinian: we think we are striving for the glory of
Rome, but we are really driven by the libido dominandi; we think we are worshiping the
gods, but we are really enslaved to demons.
3. See SMITH, supra 1, at 13.
4. Id. at 344.
5. See SMITH, supra 1, at 265.
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Most, if not all, of us have personally experienced conflicts of the
symbolic sort on which Smith focuses. Marital life is replete with them.
My wife says she is going to visit her sisters for the weekend. I explode
with anger and insist she stay home—after all, she promised we would
spend the weekend cataloguing our extensive collection of LPs. We scream
and we curse. Accusations are levelled and feelings are hurt. We retreat to
our corners and wonder how such an otherwise trivial matter could, again,
generate such passion. And we know the answer: our conflict is not really
about her sisters or our disorganized record collection. It is about something
else. No doubt that “something else” has a long history and that history
is evoked with the simple utterance, “I am planning to visit my sisters.”
We both avail ourselves of an interpretive matrix that elevates what
would otherwise be a trivial spat into a relationship-threatening crisis.
If we are going to resolve the escalated conflict, we should better figure
out what we are really fighting about. We probably need to revisit our history
to be honest and forthright about the narrative into which we are integrating
each other’s acts. We need to do for each other, perhaps with the help of
a counselor or pastor, what Smith does in his book—to help us discern
what is also really at stake in the many symbolic conflicts that divide
us.6
Of course, this way of putting it might seem to imply that Smith only
wants to facilitate mutual understanding. But of course, he is not, and
does not pretend to be, a neutral party to the religious conflict he narrates:
he concludes Pagans and Christians in the City with his assessment of the
central conflict that drives his narrative.7 Nevertheless, much of Smith’s
effort seems focused on diagnosis—showing we really are undergoing a
conflict between immanent and transcendent religiosities—and so I will
focus primarily on that diagnosis.8 Most particularly, I will assess whether
Smith has adequately characterized that conflict—whether his distinction
between transcendent and immanent religion is a helpful one, whether it
helps us to understand the various more particular symbolic conflicts by
which we are beset, and whether there is a more perspicuous and more
plausible way to understand the two competitors. As with the marital
correlate of this kind of assessment, there is not any uncontroversial,
dispassionate way to uncover what we are really arguing about, much less

6.
7.
8.

See id. at 7.
See id. at 379.
See infra Part VI.
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how to resolve what turn out to be our real disagreements. We all have
our cherished ways of understanding our conflicts, and we tend not to
react well when some interloper tells us we do not really know what we
have been fighting about. Sweet Reason is not going to adjudicate the religious
conflict on which Smith focuses, though perhaps charity has a slight chance.
III.
I will begin by providing a short biographical preface to my assessment.
My present context and recent history leads me to respond to Smith’s book
in ways that might well differ were I situated differently than I am. That
is, I think I would assess Smith’s book very differently were I to teach
undergraduates at a liberal arts college rather than future officers at a
military academy, as has been my lot in life since 2001. I hope assessing
Smith’s argument from that perspective will be illuminating.
The mission of the U.S. Naval Academy is to provide officers for the
United States Navy and Marine Corps.9 In so doing, the Academy provides
priests for the nation; it is a kind of National Seminary. As such, it is an
exceedingly religious place. Of course, this is my description of what the
Academy is up to, not the official version. For obvious reasons, no authorized
representative of the Academy would describe what they do as in any way
involving religion. It is an entirely secular affair. Except in reality, it is
not. As a religious person myself, I think I am good at smoking religion
out—at feeling intimations of the sacred even when it is unmentioned or
when it is located in, with, and under what purport to be thoroughly secular
practices. As I see it, the secular sacred is not an oxymoron but an apt
description of much that happens at the Academy—and in the military more
generally.
For example, the Academy is awash in the various external accoutrements
of the religious life. The daily rhythm of life at the Academy is highly
liturgical. Twice each day, at 8 AM and sunset, the community pauses—
military officers stand at attention, civilians place their hand over their
heart, everyone is supposed to face the flag, solemnly and silently waiting
for the communal expression of loyalty to end. Sacred places pervade public
space—the Crypt of John Paul Jones, always attended by aspiring officers; a
cemetery containing a century-and-a-half of fallen graduates to which
dignitaries, staff, faculty, and students often process through the Yard from
the Academy Chapel—most recently, John McCain’s funeral; a ceremonial
core, a quad-shaped grassy space, familiar on many college campuses, but
where jogging is impermissible, walking on the grass is forbidden, and no
9. See About USNA, U.S. NAVAL ACAD., https://www.usna.edu/About [https://perma.cc/
H88M-CUN3].
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one would even think of playing Frisbee. The Yard is replete with the
iconography of sainthood—any number of statues dedicated to admired
graduates, buildings named after great warriors such as Stockdale and
Lawrence; Halsey, King, and Mitscher. Implements of war, hallowed by
their role in either victory or defeat, dot the campus—torpedoes, cannons,
and aircrafts of various sorts.
The Naval Academy also has internal, subjective aspirations often
associated with the religious life. As with aspiring priests or pastors,
Midshipmen (Mids) must become the right kind of person if they are to
succeed in their vocation.10 Consequently, the aims of the Academy are
deeply and pervasively formative—the various educative components of
a Mids’ experience are designed to shape each’s deepest aspirations,
emotions, and understanding of what matters in life. The Academy’s
explicit mandate is to form Mids “morally, mentally and physically . . . to
imbue them with the highest ideals of duty, honor and loyalty,” such that
each enjoys the “mind and character to assume the highest responsibilities
of command, citizenship and government.”11 The aspiration of the
Academy—sincerely even if defectively pursued—is to ensure that Mids
end up having the character traits and normative commitments required
for success as an officer in the U.S. military.12 Over and over again, by
means of explicit instruction, punishments administered, rituals observed
at communal meals, admonitions before athletic events, Mids are induced
to put service over self.13 Faith, family, and friends are perfectly acceptable
objects of loyalty, but those loyalties must be properly ordered—a topic
of persistent focus in a Mids’ formal and informal training. And what
matters most—what should matter most, at least insofar as they are
military officers—is their loyalty, not to the Commander-in-Chief, not to
the Navy or Marine Corps, not to their family, and certainly not to their
career, but to the United States itself. Mids aspire to become officers in
the U.S. military and an officer is, first and foremost, a “servant of the
Nation,” as a very popular formulation has it.14

10. See Mission of USNA, U.S. NAVAL ACAD., https://www.usna.edu/About/mission.
php [https://perma.cc/9SKS-UJBN].
11. Id.
12. See id.
13. See The Blue and Gold Book, U.S. NAVAL ACAD., https://www.usna.edu/Blue
AndGoldBook [https://perma.cc/G653-26YJ].
14. Suzanne Nielson, The Army Officer as Servant, MIL. REV., Jan.–Feb. 2003, at 15,
15.
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Of course, there is plenty of formal religion at the Academy. A rather
large and imposing chapel is located at the heart of the Academy, where
Mids of all faiths and religious inclinations may find an extensive variety
of religious services, should they so choose.15 There they have access to
Protestant chaplains of various denominations, a number of Catholic chaplains,
and a rabbi.16 Overwhelmingly, the formal religion on display at the Academy
is some form of transcendent religion. In my judgment, however, it is
often of a rather crimped, tame, or subordinated sort. For many of the military
professionals with whom I have had the pleasure to work, transcendent
religion is perfectly fine—indeed, it is terrific, but only when properly
subordinate. There is great pressure to ensure Mids understand that any
commitment they might have to the transcendent must be conducive to,
or compatible with, their service to the military, their mission, and thus to
the nation that the military and mission are supposed to serve. As servants
of the nation, any allegiance Mids might have to the transcendent must be
integrated into, and thus compatible with, that self-understanding.
I do not want to imply that there is anything like uniformity or consensus
as to how military officers, aspiring or actual, are supposed to integrate
their allegiance to the transcendent into their understanding of what makes
for proper service to the nation. In my judgment, there is great pressure
to subordinate the transcendent but also considerable resistance to doing
so. As with any large population of human beings, military professionals
disagree. Unsurprisingly, then, many instances of the kinds of symbolic
conflict on which Smith focuses can be found in military settings. Consider
in this regard an episode that occurred at the Academy during the 2007–
2008 academic year.
The 11:00 AM Protestant service at the Academy Chapel is rather
liturgical; it has a kind of vague Episcopalian feel. It incorporates lots of
robes, candles, genuflections—all manner of formal acts with symbolic
import. Since the mid-1960s, the procession at the beginning of the
service has incorporated both the flag of the United States and the flag of
the Brigade of Midshipmen.17 As each passes before the altar cross on the
way to its eventual resting place, each is “dipped” to the cross.18 For some
four decades, the practice appeared uncontroversial. But in 2007, Vice15. See Spiritual Opportunities, U.S. NAVAL ACAD., http://usna.edu/Admissions/
Student-Life/Spiritual-Opportunities.php [https://perma.cc/N65Y-2H3K].
16. See Chaplain’s Center, U.S. NAVAL ACAD., https://www.usna.edu/Chaplains/
Contact_Us/index.php [https://perma.cc/XW84-2JQ4]; Jewish Chapel Community at the
United States Naval Academy, U.S. NAVAL ACAD., https://www.usna.edu/Chaplains/Faith
Community/JewishCommunities.php [https://perma.cc/F4EH-UM4X].
17. See Earl Kelly, USNA’s Flag-Dipping Under Fire, CAPITAL (Annapolis, MD),
Mar. 11, 2008, at A1.
18. See id.
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Admiral Jeffrey Fowler, then Superintendent of the Naval Academy,
objected; although he was apparently of the view that the Brigade’s flag
may be dipped to the cross, not so the flag of the United States of America.19
That was simply beyond the pale; he insisted the practice of dipping cease
and desist.20
Apparently, flag-dipping has great symbolic importance.21 The flag of
the United States represents the United States itself.22 The flag is therefore
due the honor and respect that we ought to accord to this great nation.
Federal regulations specify in some detail what counts as due respect. One
of those regulations is as follows: “No disrespect should be shown to the
flag of the United States of America; the flag should not be dipped to any
person or thing.”23 As with many rules, there are exceptions that reinforce
the values protected by that rule. For example, the Navy allows its ships
to lower their flags in response to a prior flag dipping salute from a ship
from another nation, but only in response.24 “They are dipping to us,” insisted
a retired Academy Superintendent, who was asked to comment on the
controversy.25 “We don’t dip to anybody. We answer their salute.”26
The value expressed by the regulations governing flag dipping seems
rather straightforward. Although members of other nations might be every
bit as proud of their country as we are of ours, they dip to us and, only
thereafter, we to them. And however important it might be to pious sailors
or Marines to honor God, we do not dip even to the cross, because the
United States has preeminent value. Members of the military may have
many loyalties—to family, faith, friends, service, et cetera—but they must
learn to prioritize those loyalties, such that, when they conflict, loyalty to
nation must win out. Perceiving a liturgical practice that reflected disordered
priorities, Vice-Admiral Fowler insisted the American flag no longer be
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. See David Wharton, America’s Refusal to Dip the Flag Has Complicated
Olympic History, L.A. TIMES (July 22, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jul/22/sports/
la-sp-0723-oly-dropping-flag-20120723 [https://perma.cc/VUE5-FGKY]. Of course, flag
dipping is not distinctive to the United States. See id. On the liturgical importance
of national flags, see CARLTON J.H. HAYES, NATIONALISM: A RELIGION 151 (2017).
22. See 4 U.S.C. § 8(j) (2012) (“The flag represents a living country and is itself
considered a living thing.”).
23. Id. § 8.
24. See DEP’T OF THE NAVY, PCN 50100370000, UNITED STATES NAVY REGULATIONS
§ 1263 (1990).
25. Kelly, supra note 17.
26. Id.
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dipped to the altar cross.27 Thus, Mids were to understand what being a
genuine servant of the Nation consists.
IV.
What bearing does any of this have on Smith’s argument in Pagans and
Christians in the City? Smith’s culminating chapter provides an assessment
of the comparative attractiveness of modern, immanent religion and its
more traditional transcendent competitor.28 Although ancient paganism
was seriously morally defective—the vast immiserated throng of slaves,
the ecstasy engendered by gladiatorial butchery, the exploitation of exposed
infants as prostitutes—we might very well find modern paganism quite
alluring given its commitment to the equal worth and dignity of all human
beings, advances in medical technology, and hostility to “harassment,
bullying and microaggressions.”29 T.S. Eliot claimed that people would
eventually repudiate modern paganism, but only after “contemplating—
seriously contemplating—what . . . ‘modern paganism’ would actually
entail.”30 So, Smith concludes his book by assessing that claim: “we may
as well finish by considering his suggestion—by reflecting on what a city
framed by modern paganism would entail, and by pondering whether that
is in reality the sort of city we would want to adopt as home.”31
Of course, whether “we would want to adopt” a polity that is “framed
by modern paganism”32 depends both on what such a framing actually
involves and by what we want. Smith takes as a given that we properly
“yearn for community.”33 We are social creatures; we cannot flourish absent
meaningful relationships with at least some other human beings, and once

27. Id.
28. See generally SMITH, supra note 1, at ch. 12.
29. Id. at 345.
30. Id. at 346 (quoting T.S. ELLIOT, THE IDEA OF A CHRISTIAN SOCIETY 61 (1939)).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 356. I am not entirely sure just what kind of yearning Smith has in mind
here. I wish that he specified more clearly than he does just what it takes to satisfy that
yearning. So, for example, Smith seems to run together two very different conditions: a
kind of metaphysical homelessness engendered by the ‘“disenchantment’ of the world”
and a loss of community that leads to a sense of individual isolation. Id. at 346–48 (quoting
MAX WEBER, Science as a Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 129,
155 (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds. & trans., 1948)). Although metaphysical homelessness
might be related in interesting ways to increasing individualism, they are distinct and can
come apart. For example, although it could be that the “disenchantment of the world”
might leave “human beings isolated strangers stranded in a purposeless world,” it seems
that the same process of disenchantment might just as well leave human beings a beleaguered
band in a purposeless world. Id. at 347. Lack of metaphysical purpose is compatible with
either isolation or community.
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we enter into such relationships, we need some shared terms of agreement,
some broadly shared communal self-understanding. As a consequence,
Smith begins his assessment of modern paganism by attempting to determine
whether it can “support community.”34 Ancient pagans were confident
that “citizens and subjects could be counted on to give whatever civic
allegiance they felt to the city, unqualified by loyalties to some other,
foreign or transcendent sovereign.”35 Christians were loyal to the city, to
be sure, but their allegiance to any and every polity was supposed to be
divided, and not just divided, but subordinate to their allegiance to a
transcendent Sovereign.36 So, ancient paganism fosters civic unity,
transcendent—Christian—religion divides, and the question is whether
modern paganism has the resources to “recover . . . the civic solidarity of
antiquity.”37
34. Id. at 352 (emphasis omitted).
35. Id. at 348 (emphasis omitted).
36. This kind of divided loyalty was multiply exemplified during early Christian
history. Smith discusses many cases. Here is another—the response of the “blessed
martyrs of Thebes” to the Emperor Maximian’s demand that they aid in the extirpation of
Gallic Christianity:
“We are your soldiers, emperor,” they said, “but as we freely confess, we
are nevertheless God’s slaves. To you we owe military service, to him we owe
innocence. From you we take the wages of labor, from him we have received
the beginning of life. We cannot follow the emperor in these matters so as to
deny God, our creator. If we are not by some deadly cause compelled to offend,
we will still obey you as we have done until now, but otherwise we will obey
him rather than you. We offer our hands against any enemy, but we think it
wicked to stain them with the blood of innocents. Our right hands know how to
fight against the wicked and against enemies, but not to butcher good men and
fellow citizens. . . . We have always fought for justice, goodness, and the safety
of the innocent. These things were until now our reward for the dangers. We
have fought faithfully. How may we keep faith with you if we do not show faith
to God? We swore first allegiance to God, and thence we swore allegiance to
the king.”
WILLIAM OF OCKHAM, A SHORT DISCOURSE ON THE TYRANNICAL GOVERNMENT 83–84
(Arthur Stephen McGrade ed., John Kilcullen trans., 2001). Perhaps the response is
apocryphal. See ADOLPH HARNACK, MILITIA CHRISTI: THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION AND THE
MILITARY IN THE FIRST THREE CENTURIES 96 (David McInnes Gracie trans., 1981). But
see generally Donald F. O’Reilly, The Theban Legion of St. Maurice, 32 V IGILIAE
C HRISTIANAE 195 (1978). For what it is worth, I often use this passage as a way to
introduce Mids on how to reflect on the appropriate role of religious convictions in the
military profession. See generally Christopher J. Eberle & Rick Rubel, Religious Conviction
in the Profession of Arms, 11 J. MIL. ETHICS 171 (2012) (providing a more extended
reflection on the role of religious conviction in the military).
37. SMITH, supra note 1, at 348.
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Smith is skeptical that it can. “Ancient paganism . . . was predominantly public
and communal in nature. It was manifest in spectacular temples and noisy
processions, in public sacrifices and auguries. . . . Modern paganism, by
contrast, lacks these communal elements.”38 It is pervasively individualistic:
modern paganism, as reflected in Ronald Dworkin’s “religion without God,” is
more a sort of philosophical sanctification of experiences, judgements, and
commitments that individuals are free to have or not to have. . . . [I]t is thus
predominantly personal in character.
. . . In short, present paganism, unlike its venerable predecessor, seems more
conducive to a “bowling alone” type of religiosity than to a communal one.39

I take it that one of Smith’s central complaints about modern paganism is
that it lacks the resources to provide human beings with a kind of community
for which we putatively yearn.40
This characterization of the resources of modern paganism seems to be
quite foreshortened. It leaves out what I regard as one of the most powerful
and pervasive manifestations of immanent religiosity—one that has
historically aspired to provide the very kind of civic or communal unity
that Smith associates with ancient paganism. Most particularly, it leaves
out the kind of paganism that would be, I think, most attractive to my
students—were I able to induce them to think in Smith’s categories. For
many Mids, their most sacred duty is to “support and defend” the United
States.41 Although I do not think it would be accurate to say that they
worship the United States, it is plausible to suppose that many regard the
United States as sacred, as their most important normative commitment,
and thus as the source of their most weighty normative obligations. And
of course, as I noted, their lives are full of the paraphernalia of communal
religiosity—processions and ceremonies, sacrifices and obeisance, feelings
of awe and self-transcendence. I am confident that, at least for many Mids,
immanent religion is not only alluring, but alluring precisely on account
of its promise of membership in a prized community—one that is defined
by its dedication to the defense of the sacred. And not only alluring, but
profoundly meaningful: what could make for a more meaningful life than

38. Id. at 352–53.
39. Id. at 353 (footnotes omitted) (citing RONALD DWORKIN, RELIGION WITHOUT
GOD (2013)).
40. See id. at 352–53.
41. See generally U.S. NAVAL ACAD., OATH OFFICE CEREMONY: CLASS OF 2017 (2013),
https://www.usna.edu/PlebeSummer/_files/documents/2013/2013_OathofOfficeCeremon
yProgra m_061413web.pdf [https://perma.cc/QRX7-A3VM].
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to follow generations of predecessors in dedicating yourself to the defense
of what is most valuable?42
Now you might grant that there is some comparatively small number of
Americans who find military service in the United States to be a membership
in a community that puts them in touch with a “this-worldly” sacred. But
you might also think most of us are not privy to that community; Americans
have fewer meaningful connections to the military with each successive
generation. So, despite some potential pockets of communal paganism
that retain a vestigial existence in the United States, the only kind of
immanent religiosity that is available to most of us is the individualist,
bowling-alone type that cannot satisfy our deepest communal yearnings.
Perhaps Smith hints at this in his brief dismissal of the remaining “vestiges
of the old civil religion”—presidential inaugurations, Memorial Day
parades, Thanksgiving.43 And this might seem to be pretty thin religious
gruel—at best a kind of Unitarian paganism, incapable of evoking religiouslike awe or of satisfying our yearning for community. But I think that this
response underestimates the attractiveness of the nation as a location for
the sacred, as a source of communal unity, and as a source of meaning.
Consider two points in this regard. First, many advocates of nationalism
have regarded transcendent religion as a primary competitor for loyalty.44
Their self-understanding is that proper loyalty to the nation requires either
the replacement of God by the nation or a rather straightened subordination
of God to the nation.45 This self-understanding has a very long history.
So, for example, the early nationalist ideologue Moritz Arndt advocated a
kind of Holy War against Napoleon: “I hate all the French without exception
in the name of God and my people. I teach my son this hatred. I will work
to the end of my days to ensure that this deprecation and hatred strikes the
deepest roots in German hearts.”46 Arndt’s hatred was apparently grounded

42. See SMITH, supra note 1, at 367–72 (discussing modern paganism’s ability to
connect humans to the sacred and give meaning to life). I take it that these two features—
some emotion-inducing connection to the sacred and some life-orienting meaning—are
the central elements of Smith’s conception of the religious.
43. Id. at 352–53.
44. See, e.g., Bruce Ashford, The (Religious) Problem with Nationalism, ETHICS &
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY COMMISSION S. BAPTIST CONVENTION (Jan. 25, 2016), https://erlc.com/
resource-library/articles/the-religious-problem-with-nationalism [https://perma.cc/85D5SM4W].
45. See id.
46. MICHAEL BURLEIGH, EARTHLY POWERS: THE CLASH OF RELIGION AND POLITICS
IN EUROPE FROM THE FRENCH REVOLUTION TO THE GREAT WAR 159 (2007) (citing R.R.
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on a devotion to his nation that seems to have left no place for any serious,
nation-transcendent allegiance:
To be a nation, to have one feeling for one cause, to come together with the bloody
sword of revenge, is the religion of our times. Leave all the little religions behind
and perform the great duty to the single highest, and unite yourself in it to one
belief high above the Pope or Luther. That is the ultimate religion, to hold the
Fatherland more dearly than lords and princes, than father and mother, than wives
and children.47

I think that it would be quite easy to arrange a very long and impressive
sequence of nationalist luminaries who understood the loyalty to the nation
to compete with allegiance to any transcendent God and who thus see in
the nation an inner-worldly replacement for the transcendent.48
Second, nationalism has often taken on many of the psychological,
sociological, and political functions of religion.49 I know of no better analysis
of the “religiosity” of nationalism than Carleton Hayes’ Nationalism: A
Religion.50
Since its advent in western Europe, modern nationalism has partaken of the
nature of a religion. . . .
. . . [L]ike any religion, [it] calls into play not simply the will but the intellect,
the imagination, and the emotions. The intellect constructs a speculative theology
or mythology of nationalism. The imagination builds an unseen world around
the . . . past and . . . future. . . . The emotions arouse a joy and ecstasy in the
contemplation of the national god who is all-good and all-protecting, a longing
for his favors, a thankfulness for his benefits . . . and feelings of awe and
reverence at the immensity of his power . . . .
....
. . . Nowadays the individual is born into the national state, and the secular
registration of birth is the national rite of baptism. Thenceforth the state solicitously
follows him though life, tutoring him in a national catechism, teaching him by
pious schooling and precept the beauties of national holiness, fitting him for a life
of service (no matter how exalted or how menial) to the state . . . . If he has been
a crusader in behalf of nationalism, his place of entombment is marked with the
ensign of his service. The funerals of national heroes and potentates are celebrated with
magnificent pomp and circumstance, while, since World War I, a most sacred

PALMER, TWELVE WHO RULED: THE YEAR OF THE TERROR IN THE FRENCH REVOLUTION
118–19 (1941)).
47. Id. at 159–60; see also DAVID A. BELL, THE FIRST TOTAL WAR 294–98 (2007)
(discussing Bell’s reflections on Arndt’s nationalism).
48. See BURLEIGH, supra note 46, at 1–14 (discussing nationalism and allegiance to
God through a history of the battles over religion in modern Europe).
49. See, e.g., Barbara-Ann J. Rieffer, Religion and Nationalism: Understanding the
Consequences of a Complex Relationship, 3 ETHNICITIES 215, 215–24 (2003).
50. CARLETON J.H. HAYES, NATIONALISM: A RELIGION (1960).
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shrine in a nation’s capital is the “Tomb of the Unknown Soldier.” Here shine
perpetual lights. Here floral offerings ever repose.51

And so on . . . flags, anthems, pilgrimages, temples, saints—all putatively
secular, but the mélange of which manifests and maintains a religious or
quasi-religious sensibility.
Now you might think nationalism might have functioned as an alternative
religion in other times or states, but not in the United States—that we
Americans are too attached to individualism and solitary bowling to be
card-carrying nationalists of anything like the Arndtian sort. Perhaps so.
And so perhaps the United States cannot form the sacred core of an imminent
paganism that provides for the communal unity fostered by ancient paganism.
But I wonder. Religious commitment waxes and wanes; it can lie dormant,
unnoticed, and quiescent for extended periods and then spring to life in
utterly unpredictable ways. For adherents of transcendent religion, personal
trauma often has this effect; excruciating suffering is often the genesis of
a recovery of faith, not, as many of its critics might think appropriate, its
extinction. And for those who locate the immanent sacred in the nation,
a different kind of trauma often serves that invigorating function. As Stanley
Hauerwas has argued, “war remains for Americans our most determinative
moral reality.”52 It “is a mighty practice,” both ennobling and destructive.53
51. Id. at 164–65; see also NIGEL ASTON, RELIGION AND REVOLUTION IN FRANCE,
1780–1804, at 188 (2000) (explaining that in some cases, nationalism is self-consciously
and intentionally adopted as a religion, one intended to replace a more traditional, and less
cooperative, competitor). Recall the various attempts during the French Revolution
to replace the public endorsement of Catholicism with a “cult of the nation” that valorized
core liberal values—reason, liberty, and equality—crosses in towns and villages were to
be replaced with statues to “Liberty and . . . Equality”; the state could not celebrate
the Triumph of Christ but could celebrate the Triumph of Reason. ASTON, supra. There
would be, in the words of the Bishop Gobel on the occasion of his resignation from the
see of Paris, “no more public and national worship but that of Liberty and Holy Equality.”
Id.; see also JOHN MCMANNERS, THE FRENCH REVOLUTION AND THE CHURCH 68–76 (1st
Harper Torchbook ed. 1970) (explaining that the idea that nationalism can be adopted,
whether consciously or not, as a replacement for religion naturally raises a question about
the meaning of the so-called non-establishment clause: can state practices that further the
“worship of the state” violate the non-establishment clause?; Is it possible for affirmation
of core liberal values—those that define the normative core of a liberal patriotism—to
violate the Non-Establishment Clause?; What understanding of that clause would allow
for that verdict, given that all manifestations of a liberalism nationalism might be resolutely
‘secular’ in content?).
52. STANLEY HAUERWAS, WAR AND THE AMERICAN DIFFERENCE: THEOLOGICAL
REFLECTIONS ON VIOLENCE AND NATIONAL IDENTITY 34 (2011).
53. Id. at 69.
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It generates the sense that the nation is sacred and it manifests that sense
as well.54 After all, war requires that we sacrifice great goods: our children,
our friends, and our compatriots—even if not our own life. We sacrifice
those goods in the service of something else, but we do not sacrifice them
for trivial ends.55 We do so to achieve goods that make that sacrifice
intelligible, sensible, and justifiable. For many Americans, the good that
renders the sacrifice of our children, friends, and compatriots worthwhile
is not merely a nation-state. It is a nation-state that instantiates very great
moral goods—freedom, autonomy, human rights, democracy. This
understanding of what makes waging war worthwhile pervades American

54. See HARRY S. STOUT, UPON THE ALTAR OF THE NATION: A MORAL HISTORY OF
CIVIL WAR, at xvii–xxi (2006) (explaining that the American Civil War played a
crucial role in consecrating the United States for many Americans).
55. See HAUERWAS, supra note 52, at 68–69. Hauerwas seems to be presupposing
here an idea that I have heard expressed in various formulations, often by pacifists, which
is the idea that we can determine what we really regard as sacred—not merely what we
say is sacred—by the sacrifices we are willing to make. So, for example, Michael Budde
states, “Let me provide a suggestion, a sort of pragmatic and functional understanding of
the idolatry of the nation state. The state is an object of ultimate allegiance . . . to the extent that
people are willing to kill for it, die for it, and pay for it.” Michael L. Budde, Liberal
Democracy: An Alternative to the Idolatry of the National State?, in T HEOLOGY AND
PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY: FOUR CONVERSATIONS 130 (Kenneth L. Grasso & Cecilia Rodriguez
Castillo eds., 2012). More expansively, Carolyn Martin and David Ingle explain:
In the religiously plural society of the United States, sectarian faith is optional
for citizens, as everyone knows. Americans have rarely bled, sacrificed or died
for Christianity or any other sectarian faith. Americans have often bled, sacrificed
and died for their country. This fact is an important clue to its religious
power. . . . What is really true in any society is what is worth killing for, and
what citizens can be compelled to sacrifice their lives for.
HAUERWAS, supra note 52, at 67–68 (quoting CAROLYN MARVIN & DAVID W. INGLE,
BLOOD SACRIFICE AND THE NATION: TOTEM RITUALS AND THE AMERICAN FLAG 9 (1999)).
Furthermore, William Cavanaugh states:
[T]he late Chief Justice William Rehnquist acknowledged, in supporting a proposed
amendment against “desecration” of the flag, that the flag is regarded by
Americans “with an almost mystical reverence.”
Here the word “almost” is crucial, for American civil religion can never
acknowledge that it is in fact religion: to do so would be to invite charges of
idolatry. Here liturgical gesture is central, because gesture allows the flag to be
treated as a sacred object, while language denies that that is the case. Everyone
acknowledges verbally that the nation and the flag are not really gods, but the
crucial test is what people do with their bodies, both in liturgy and in war. It is
clear that, among those who identify themselves as Christians in the United
States and other countries, there are very few who would be willing to kill in the
name of the Christian God, whereas the willingness, under certain circumstances, to
kill and die for the nation in war is generally taken for granted.
WILLIAM T. CAVANAUGH, MIGRATIONS OF THE HOLY: GOD, STATE, AND THE POLITICAL
MEANING OF THE CHURCH 119 (2011) (footnote omitted) (quoting MARVIN & INGLE, supra,
at 30).
THE
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history.56 And it binds us together: war integrates “the many into one: we
must all stand together when faced with an enemy.”57 Just recall our collective
experience after 9/11—war is a community-producing project.58 It evokes
in many Americans what seems to be the kind of communal bonding absent
from the individualistic, immanent paganism on which Smith focuses.
And so perhaps there is a version of modern paganism—one that locates
the sacred in a nation-state dedicated to freedom, autonomy, and
democracy—that is capable of sustaining the kind of communal bonds
that were present in ancient paganism but fractured by Christianity.
For what it is worth, I think that I know a number of American Christians
who are really modern pagans—who regard the United States as their
highest loyalty and for whom their commitment to the transcendent matters
far less to them by comparison. And the idea that many, or even most,
American Christians are actually pagans seems to be compatible with
Smith’s understanding of what makes for paganism.59 Although I take
him to define immanent religion in significant part by its doctrinal
specification of the sacred—he “locates” the sacred in some this-worldly
aspect of reality, and this kind of doctrinal commitment does not seem
necessary. After all, if I sincerely believe, as a matter of fact, that the
traditional transcendent God of Christianity exists, yet I care far more
about my country than I do about God, then it seems that I am actually
a pagan.60 This is one reason why it is so hard to tell how many Americans
adhere to either transcendent or immanent religion: if my status as a pagan
depends not so much on the content of my beliefs about the sacred as on
which of my beliefs matter most to me, then the way we normally figure
56. See generally JONATHAN H. EBEL, FAITH IN THE FIGHT: RELIGION AND THE
AMERICAN SOLDIER IN THE GREAT WAR (2010); RICHARD M. GAMBLE, THE WAR FOR
RIGHTEOUSNESS: PROGRESSIVE CHRISTIANITY, THE GREAT WAR, AND THE RISE OF THE
MESSIANIC NATION (2003); STOUT, supra note 54.
57. CAVANAUGH, supra note 55, at 68.
58. See Jeff Guo, Researchers Have Found that War Has a Remarkable and
Miraculous Effect, WASH. POST (June 28, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/
wp/2016/06/28/researchers-have-found-that-war-has-a-remarkable-and-miraculous-effect/
?utm_term=.b35306e66e0a [https://perma.cc/V93F-JJ4Q].
59. See SMITH, supra note 1, at 346–48.
60. There is an interesting vignette about this point related in David Bellavia’s
memoir of the Iraq War that I discuss in my book, Justice and the Just War Tradition;
though, I did not construe him as a pagan, not having read Smith’s book at the time I wrote
that book. See CHRISTOPHER J. EBERLE, JUSTICE AND THE JUST WAR TRADITION: HUMAN
WORTH, MORAL FORMATION, AND ARMED CONFLICT 32–33 (2016) (quoting DAVID BELLAVIA,
HOUSE TO HOUSE: A SOLDIER’S MEMOIR 44 (1st Free Press Trade paperback ed. 2008)).
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out what our compatriots believe—some pollster asking very simple questions
over the phone or online—is not a particularly reliable way to determine
their religious status. Pollsters are not very good at getting at what really
matters to us. They certainly seem to be incapable of providing us with
reliable information as to whether Americans care more about the “god of
Americanism” than the Triune God.61
What does this mean for Smith’s argument? His concluding chapter
queries whether modern, immanent paganism has the resources to provide
for the communal unity that human beings desire, need, or crave.62 He is
skeptical that it can, at least partly by virtue of the fact that modern paganism
seems irremediably individualistic, thin, and undemanding.63 But there
are many different kinds of immanent religion, many different places at
which to locate the this-worldly sacred. One prominent possibility is that
we identify the sacred with individual human beings, their rights, their
rationality, their autonomy, or some assemblage thereof.64 That is a conception
of the sacred prominently on offer in many American contexts—perhaps
most notably in liberal arts colleges and shopping malls. And perhaps that
individualistic conception of the sacred is largely at work in the symbolic
conflicts on which Smith focuses. But there are other possible locations
of the immanent sacred—not only individual human beings but also the
moral communities that produce those human beings, that inculcate belief
in their equal dignity, and that realize their rights. It is not only the dignified
individual who is sacred but also the cultural, historical, and political
collectivity that produces and protects the dignified individual.65 Perhaps
61. JAMES K.A. SMITH, Chapter 19: The God of Americanism: On Mitt Romney’s
“Faith in America,” in THE DEVIL READS DERRIDA 102, 102–04 (2009).
62. See SMITH, supra note 1, at 346–47.
63. This is Smith’s eventual verdict:
Humans are also active and embodied beings, living in the world; so
religions both ancient and modern have provided their adherents with precepts
and commandments—with things to do, ways to live. These have included both
the rituals and libations and sacrifices of ancient paganism and Judaism and the
moral instructions and liturgies of Judaism and Christianity.
By contrast, modern philosophical paganism (at least of the Dworkinian
variety) offers none of these things. It sponsors no ceremonies, prescribes
no rituals. It does not attempt to explain why the world exists, why we suffer,
or whether there is anything for us after death. In this respect, once again, modern
paganism is minimalist in comparison either to its ancient predecessor or its more
modern transcendent competitors. One wonders whether modern paganism is simply
too intellectually, morally, and ceremonially or liturgically thin to provide
what religions are supposed to provide.
Id. at 371.
64. See H. Butterfield, Reflections on Religion and Modern Individualism, 22 J. HIST.
IDEAS 41–42 (1961).
65. In contrast to the individualistic, bowling-alone kind of modern paganism on
which Smith seems mostly to have in his evaluative sights, collective, nationalist manifestations
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this conception of the sacred is involved in a whole range of symbolic
conflicts as well—not only those on which Smith focuses but also many
others including those about immigration, torture, kneeling during the
national anthem, and so on.66 It seems to me that Smith’s assessment of
modern paganism would be much improved, even if made more complex,
were he to address more communal forms of paganism such as those that
privilege the nation-state, and, even more, those versions of modern paganism
that privilege nation-states that instantiate liberal values.67
I think that more complicated discussion would provide an ideal opportunity
to address one of the signal ways in which transcendent religion can help
us to resist one of the besetting temptations of nationalism. Human beings
are powerfully tempted to make a god of their nation and when they do
so, that god “begins to be a demon.”68 Human beings are tribal creatures
who tend vastly to overestimate the worth of their nation-state—by which
they are pervasively socialized—and when they do so, they are also
of modern paganism can be extremely demanding—and might very well be preferable to
many Americans on just that count. See SMITH, supra note 1, at 347. For example, many
of my students attend the Academy precisely because they think it will involve both
demanding and meaningful service to the nation.
66. This provides one of many reasons to be skeptical of Mark Tushnet’s assertion
that “[t]he culture wars are over.” SMITH, supra note 1, at 344 (emphasis omitted) (quoting
Mark Tushnet, Abandoning Defensive Crouch Liberal Constitutionalism, BALKINIZATION
(May 6, 2016), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2016/05/abandoning-defensive-crouch-liberal.html
[https://perma.cc/D4RP-YXDA]. The culture wars are never over. They began before the
United States came into existence; they have persisted throughout; and there is no good
reason to think they will end in the lifetime of anyone who reads this paper. See Michael
Kazin, America’s Never-Ending Culture War, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 24, 2018), https://
www.nytimes.com/2018/08/24/opinion/sunday/chicago-protests-1968-culture-war.html
[https://perma.cc/Q53B-9XTM]. The flashpoints change from the delivery of the mail on
Sundays to the delivery of healthcare. And they can incorporate new or revivified or
significantly altered actors. Who knows, perhaps we will experience culture wars between
competing pagan sects—those that privilege the individualistic immanent and those that
privilege the communal or national sacred. After all, there is no reason to believe “modern
paganism,” as Smith conceives it, is any less fissiparous than your garden variety Protestant
denomination. SMITH, supra note 1, at 347–48. In any case, “the culture wars” are not
going away anytime soon, which might provide at least pragmatic reason to moderate Tushnet’s
triumphalist declaration. Id. at 344 (emphasis omitted).
67. Particularly interesting in this regard is a report by the Committee on National
Attitudes, drafted by Carleton Hayes and published in 1937, on how Catholics should think
about patriotism, nationalism, and universal Christian norms. See generally CARLTON J.H.
HAYES, COMM. ON NAT’L ATTITUDES, PATRIOTISM, NATIONALISM AND THE BROTHERHOOD
OF MAN (1937).
68. C.S. LEWIS, THE FOUR LOVES 6–8 (1988) (discussing what makes for healthy
love of country).
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powerfully tempted to do all sorts of horrible things in its service.69
Transcendent religion provides one important moral resource for resisting
this kind of apotheosis-induced atrocity: any and all nations, however
excellent, are under God, each nation is therefore accountable to God, and
thus each member of each nation must be prepared to resist the temptation
to protect it at all costs.70 To return to the flag-dipping story I mentioned
earlier,71 the importance of refusing to impute any sacred quality to the
nation seems to have been one of the main reasons why many of the
parishioners at the Academy fought so hard against the Superintendent’s
order that they cease and desist dipping the flag before the Chapel alter.
Here I speculate that many knew from personal experience the moral
danger posed by according sacred status to the nation, believed that it was
crucially important to the formation of Mids that they be apprised of that
danger, and so availed themselves of a liturgical practice to do so, at least
for those Mids who chose to attend chapel services. “‘I think the ceremony
is fully representative of the highest traditions of our country,’ said Bob
Morrison. ‘It basically says that our country is one nation under God and
the nation-state is not the highest authority in the world.’”72

69. I discuss one such case in the next Part: Michael Walzer’s communitarian rationale
for the so-called supreme emergency exemption. See infra pp. 270–71; see also MICHAEL WALZER,
ARGUING ABOUT WAR 33–35 (2004).
70. Here is Carleton Hayes’s perspective on the tension between transcendent
religion and the immanent religion of nationalism:
The religion of nationalism, if we may use the phrase, superficially resembles
real religion: it has dogmas; it has a cult, with holydays and ceremonial observances;
it appropriates religious, even Christian, phrases and formulas; and it instills in
its worshipers a strong sense of obligation and devotion. In essential respects,
however, it is different from Christianity, and quite antithetical to it. It is thisworldly, rather than other-worldly; its kingdom is of this world. It takes no
account of the supernatural, ignoring if not openly denying it, but bases itself on
what it accepts as the natural order and what it interprets as “realistic”; it exalts
not the Bible or the Christian Fathers, but the positivism of Auguste Comte, the
politics of Machiavelli, the romanticism of literary men of modern times, or the
racialism of pseudo-scientists of the late nineteenth century. It is exclusive
rather than comprehensive, being concerned with a particular people rather than
with all peoples. It flatly contradicts the Catholic principle expressed by St.
Paul: “There is neither Jew nor Gentile, there is neither Greek nor Barbarian,
there is neither bond nor free: for you are all one in Christ Jesus.”
HAYES, supra note 67, at 18.
71. See supra Part III.
72. Neela Banerjee, Clashing over Church Ritual and Flag Protocol at the Naval
Academy Chapel, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 8, 2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/08/us/
08chapel.html [https://perma.cc/E9EU-XYUH]. Bob Morrison is a long-time attendant of
the Protestant Service at the Naval Academy. See id.
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V.
It might seem that I am not being entirely fair to Smith. He seems to
me to conceive of modern, immanent paganism in pretty thoroughly
individualistic terms. The primary location of the sacred for modern pagans
seems to be in “the human person.”73 But he also considers two theorists
who try to rescue some aspects of the communal for modern paganism.
John Rawls is one of those theorists, and although he is often construed as
a resolutely individualistic thinker, Smith emphasizes the communitarian
aspirations that have long characterized Rawls’s work.74 If Smith is correct,
Rawls “exhibited a desire to overcome the divisions introduced by Christianity
and to recover, in modern form, the civic solidarity of antiquity.”75 Crucial
to that recovery project is Rawls’s ideal of public reason—that ideal
includes at least some understanding of what makes for “shared reasons,”
specifies constraints on the justificatory role of “non-shared” reasons in
political decision-making and public deliberation, and thereby indicates
how a diversely committed population can prevent the transcendent from
performing its familiar divisive role.76 It is worth citing a longer passage
in which Smith articulates this understanding of Rawls:
The ancient city was able to maintain the kind of unity Rawls sought because the
various pagan or polytheistic cults were already inclined to take a relaxed attitude
toward truth, as historians have emphasized, and to cheerfully suppose that their
superficially diverse deities were probably just the same set of gods going under
different names, or at least were members of a common pantheon. . . .
In the modern Christian or post-Christian world, by contrast, that kind of natural
unity is no longer available. So how is the genuine community to be achieved? . . .
Rawls’s answer (and that of other like-minded liberal theorists) was, basically, to
distance the political community from divisive Truth by constructing a civic sphere
from which transcendent religion and other potentially disruptive “comprehensive
doctrines” would be excluded. Citizens might retain their religious or philosophical
convictions for private purposes, but upon entering the civic sphere they would
put aside these rival “comprehensive doctrines” and would deliberate with mutual
73. David Bentley Hart, Human Dignity Was a Rarity Before Christianity, CHURCH
LIFE J. (Oct. 26, 2017), https://churchlife.nd.edu/2017/10/26/human-dignity-rarity-beforechristianity/ [https://perma.cc/YRX8-SJSC].
74. See SMITH, supra note 1, at 348–50. Some public reason liberals embrace the
accusation that they are really after a kind of “poor man’s communitarianism.” Andrew
Lister, The Public Justification of What? Coercion VS. Decision as Competing Frames for
the Basic Principle of Justificatory Liberalism, 25 PUB. AFF. Q. 349, 363 (2011).
75. SMITH, supra note 1, at 348.
76. Jonathan Quong, Public Reason, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Jan. 11, 2018),
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/public-reason/ [https://perma.cc/83EF-77T5].
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respect under the canopy of a shared “public reason.” In this way, the unity and
community that came naturally to the ancient pagan city would be reconstructed
artificially, so to speak—by constructing walls around a core civic sphere
and keeping Christianity and other strong faiths and philosophies outside those
walls.77

This is a fairly abstract description of Rawls. To provide a somewhat
more concrete sense of how Rawls might be thought to rescue community
in contemporary liberal polities, I would like to discuss one of Rawls’s
most extensive, most fascinating, yet least discussed assessments of the
justificatory role of religious reasons—his assessment of religious objections
to the British area bombing campaign during the Second World War. It
might seem to exemplify in a most bracing manner Rawls’s contribution
to modern paganism: the construction of a wall “around a core civic
sphere” that excludes “Christianity and other strong faiths.”78
As it happens, Rawls articulates his assessment of the British area bombing
campaign and its religious critics as he lays out his understanding of the
just war tradition.79 Three elements of his treatment of that tradition are
particularly relevant to my discussion. First, Rawls affirms the claim that
most polities have a right to self-defense: if he is correct, “any society that
is nonaggressive and that honors human rights” enjoys such a right.80
Second, Rawls affirms familiar “in bello” constraints, most particularly
the principle of civilian immunity.81 States victimized by a wrongful attack
must carefully distinguish between the aggressor’s leaders and its general
population.82 The former “are responsible; they willed the war; and for
doing that, they are criminals,” so they may be directly targeted with necessary
and proportionate military violence.83 Not so the civilian population, which
is “often kept in ignorance and swayed by state propaganda.”84 Given that
they lack responsibility for initiating the unjust attack that provides a just
cause for war, civilians ought not be targeted by military violence during
the prosecution of the ensuing war. Third, Rawls adopts one very significant
exception to the principle of civilian immunity. That is, he affirms a version
of Michael Walzer’s so-called supreme emergency exemption, which “allows
us to set aside—in certain special circumstances—the strict status of civilians
77. SMITH, supra note 1, at 349–50 (footnotes omitted).
78. Id. at 350.
79. See John Rawls, 50 Years After Hiroshima, DISSENT MAG., Summer 1995, at
323, 323. This comports with Rawls’s self-understanding that the morality of war “does
not . . . depart from [Walzer’s treatment in Just and Unjust Wars] in any significant respect.”
JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES, 95 n.8 (1999).
80. RAWLS, supra note 79, at 92.
81. Id. at 94.
82. Id. at 94–95.
83. Id. at 95.
84. Id.
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that normally prevents their being directly attacked in war.”85 Rawls
illustrates that exemption by reference to Great Britain’s circumstances
relatively early in the Second World War—after the fall of France and
before it was clear that the British would be able to withstand the Nazi
assault.86 According to Rawls, “Nazism portended incalculable moral and
political evil for civilized life everywhere. . . . [T]he nature and history of
constitutional democracy and its place in European history were at stake,”
and the British “had no other means to break Germany’s superior power.”87
In those dire circumstances, the British were “justifie[d] [in] invoking the
supreme emergency exemption.”88
When Rawls adopts the supreme emergency exemption, he adopts a
moral principle that can help to legitimize exceptionally brutal military
violence. After all, what it means for the strict status of civilians to be
“set aside” is that states with modern militaries may deliberately deploy
their vast resources to kill, maim, and terrorize nuns, babies, patients in
hospitals, children at play, and many other kinds of innocent and harmless
human beings.89 The details are depressing. So, for example, the bombing
of Hamburg, suitably designated “Operation Gomorrah,” was vast in scale
and horrific in effect.90 In late July of 1943, the Royal Air Force (RAF)
dropped over 9000 tons of bombs in 3000 sorties during four separate
raids on Hamburg—selected for its relative proximity to Great Britain, the
paucity of intervening air defenses, and various military targets therein.91
Most of the bombs dropped were incendiaries: some contained benzol,
others rags soaked in benzene or heavy oil, and still others gelled petroleum
inextinguishable with water.92 Some were time-delayed, exploding several
hours after being dropped, to deter fire crews and medical units from dealing
with the continuing effects of earlier bombs.93 The resulting firestorm—

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id. at 98.
See id.
Id. at 98–99.
Id. at 99.
Id. at 98, 100.
A.C. GRAYLING, AMONG THE DEAD CITIES: THE HISTORY AND MORAL LEGACY
OF THE WWII BOMBING OF CIVILIANS IN GERMANY AND JAPAN 16 (2006).
91. Id. at 19.
92. Id. at 88–89. Bomber Command well appreciated the “anti-morale” effect of
fires that flare again as soon as the water was turned off. MARTIN MIDDLEBROOK, THE
BATTLE OF HAMBURG: ALLIED BOMBER FORCES AGAINST A GERMAN CITY IN 1943, at 119
(1981).
93. See GRAYLING, supra note 90, at 89.
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the war’s first—created temperatures of 800 degrees centigrade and winds
at hurricane speeds, snatching bodies into the air or turning them into
human torches.94 Its glow could be seen up to 120 miles away.95 “Noone knows exactly how many died, but at least 45,000 corpses lay among
the smoking ruins, with many more injured and traumatized.”96 The effects
of the bombing reverberated throughout Germany, as a stream of over one
million refugees exited the remains of the city, which included one
deranged mother who was discovered in Bavaria carrying in her luggage
the charred corpse of her child, “a relic of a past that was still intact a few
days [earlier].”97
Rawls no doubt knew of all this and affirmed the supreme emergency
exemption nonetheless.98 Indeed, he not only asserts that the direct targeting
of a vast number of innocents was justifiable, but he also strongly implies
that statesmen—“great leaders of peoples” who see “deeper and further
than most others and grasp what needs to be done”—are duty bound to target
innocents when they find themselves in a supreme emergency.99 This is
an exceptionally contentious claim. Indeed, Rawls notes that this understanding

94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. at 83–84 (quoting MIDDLEBROOK, supra note 92, at 224–25).
RICHARD OVERY, WHY THE ALLIES WON 120 (1995).
GRAYLING, supra note 90, at 20.
Id. at 20, 84–85 (quoting W.G. S EBALD , O N THE N ATURAL H ISTORY OF
DESTRUCTION 29 (Anthea Bell trans., 1st U.S. ed. 2003)). “What the effect was may
be inferred from the ejaculations of one German radio commentator (Dr. Carl Hofman):
‘Terror . . . terror . . . terror. [P]ure, naked, bloody terror.’” John C. Ford, The Morality
of Obliteration Bombing, 5 THEOLOGICAL STUD. 261, 293 (1944) (quoting J.M. SPAIGHT,
B OMBING V INDICATED : A S URVEY OF R ECENT D EVELOPMENTS BY T HIS L EADING
AUTHORITY ON AIR WARFARE 89 (1944)).
98. Rawls did not explicitly endorse the bombing of Hamburg, but he implied that
it might have been morally permissible when he said “the bombing of German cities was
arguably justifiable” until such a time as Great Britain was able to fend off the German
attack. RAWLS, supra note 79, at 98–99. Even some fifty years after the termination of
the Second World War, Rawls seemed uncertain as to when the latter condition was met.
He seemed confident that Great Britain was permitted intentionally to target German cities
early on in the war: “This period extended, at the least, from the fall of France in June
1940 until Russia had clearly beaten off the first German assault in the summer and fall of
1941.” Id. at 98. But he also granted that “it could be argued” that Great Britain was
justified in targeting German cities “until the summer and fall of 1942 or even through the
Battle of Stalingrad (which ended with German surrender in February 1943).” Id. at 99.
So, Operation Gomorrah might have occurred a couple months too late: July 1943.
GRAYLING, supra note 90, at 89. That said, if Rawls were willing to grant the possible
legitimacy of a three years long open season on German cities, it could surely be argued
as well—and was argued—that the permissible bombing of German cities included the
firebombing of Hamburg. See RAWLS, supra note 79, at 98.
99. RAWLS, supra note 79, at 97, 99. According to Rawls, “the statesman” is a
moral ideal that applies to those who occupy certain political roles. Id. at 97. So, for
example, a President, Prime Minister, or legislator should adhere to the norms required of
a statesman. Id. at 97, 99.
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of the duties of statesmen conflicts with the moral and theological selfunderstanding of certain religious believers: “Political liberalism allows the
supreme emergency exemption; the Catholic doctrine [of double effect]
rejects it, saying that we must have faith and adhere to God’s command.”100
Rawls has in mind here a powerful essay in which Elizabeth Anscombe
argues that Christian teaching includes a number of absolute prohibitions.101
One of those prohibitions precludes “the deliberate killing of the innocent,
whether for its own sake or as a means to some further end.”102 Anscombe
suggests “[i]t is nonsense to pretend” that the deliberate obliteration of a
city might not involve the deliberate killing of the innocent inhabitants of
that city,103 and therefore a bombing campaign of the sort carried out by
the RAF against German cities is incompatible with core Christian moral
teachings.104

100. Id. at 105. I should note that here Rawls uses the language of permission, but
he also uses the language of obligation. Perhaps this ambiguity indicates a—morally
admirable—queasiness on Rawls’s part.
101. See generally 3 G.E.M. ANSCOMBE, War and Murder, in ETHICS, RELIGION AND
POLITICS 51 (1981).
Christianity forbids a number of things as being bad in themselves. . . . These
absolute prohibitions of Christianity by no means exhaust its ethic; there is a
large area where what is just is determined partly by a prudent weighing up of
consequences. But the prohibitions are bedrock, and without them the Christian
ethic goes to pieces.
Id. at 58; see also 3 G.E.M. ANSCOMBE, Modern Moral Philosophy, in ETHICS, RELIGION
AND POLITICS, supra note 101, at 26, 34.
102. ANSCOMBE, supra note 101, at 53–54.
103. Id. at 59; see also Ford, supra note 97, at 291.
104. See ANSCOMBE, supra note 101, at 59. So, for example, the Jesuit theologian
John Ford, in his justly famous assessment of what he called the Allied “obliteration
bombing” campaign, wrote in 1944:
It is fundamental in the Catholic view that to take the life of an innocent
person is always intrinsically wrong, that is, forbidden absolutely by natural law.
Neither the state nor any private individual can thus dispose of the lives of the
innocent. The killing of enemy soldiers in warfare was justified by older writers
on the theory that they were not innocent but guilty. They were guilty of unjust
aggression, or of a violation of rights which could be forcibly vindicated. The
individual enemy soldiers might be only materially guilty, but it was this guilt,
and their immediate cooperation in violent unjust acts that made them legitimate
objects of direct killing. As far as I know, this distinction between the innocent
and guilty has never been abandoned by Catholic theologians. They still maintain
that it is always intrinsically wrong to kill directly the innocent civilians of the
enemy country.
Ford, supra note 97, at 272.

273

EBERLE FINAL TO PRINT.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

5/3/2019 9:21 AM

Although, Rawls says, this doctrine is “intelligible,” adhering to it is
“contrary to the duties of the statesman in political liberalism.”105 Here,
Rawls appeals to a familiar distinction between the political and the personal:
“The statesman must look to the political world, and must, in extreme
cases, be able to distinguish between the interests of the well-ordered
regime he or she serves and the dictates of the religious, philosophical, or
moral doctrine that he or she personally lives by.”106 The statesman’s
public duties are one thing, her personal religious qualms are another, and
she must not allow the latter to prevent her from satisfying the former.
I find Rawls’s assessment doubly perplexing. First, the supreme emergency
exemption is arguably “the most controversial, and consequential, amendment
to just war theory ever proposed.”107 Consequently, it is most surprising
that Rawls does very little to justify it. His treatment is remarkably
sparse—he focuses primarily on delimiting the conditions in which a
polity might be exempt from the principle of civilian immunity and hardly
at all on justifying that exemption. But of course, what is most controversial
is not the scope of the exemption; it is the exemption itself. About that,
we are left to speculate. Second, even if Rawls were convinced by some
personally compelling argument to adopt the supreme emergency exemption,
why did he take its affirmation to be a duty of statesmanship? Rawls
famously believed human beings are vulnerable to a number of epistemic
burdens that lead even the most competent and conscientious to disagree
about all manner of important moral, religious and philosophical doctrines.108
Surely disagreement about what we must do in a supreme emergency is
just one of the many reasonable differences of conviction that arise
between reasonable people: if reasonable people intractably disagree
about his “difference principle,” as Rawls avers,109 then surely statesmen
intractably disagree about whether we may deliberately target innocent
human beings in a supreme emergency. But in that case, why not allow
statesmen the moral latitude either to affirm or to deny the supreme
emergency exemption?
The following is one speculative answer to that question—one that
reads Rawls’s discussion of the supreme emergency exemption in the light
of his understanding of public reason.110 When a rights-respecting polity
105. RAWLS, supra note 79, at 105.
106. Id.
107. BRIAN OREND, THE MORALITY OF WAR 141 (2006).
108. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, at xvi–xviii (1993).
109. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 75 (1971).
110. More particularly, I read Rawls’s treatment of the supreme emergency exemption
in light of his treatment of “stand-offs” between competing public reasons:
[I]f, when stand-offs occur, citizens simply invoke grounding reasons of their
comprehensive views, the principle of reciprocity is violated. From the point of
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finds itself in a supreme emergency, it faces a conflict between two very
weighty political commitments: the right of rights-respecting states to defend
against an annihilative attack and the right of ordinary, unoffending
civilians to be free from direct military attack.111 Given that they conflict,
these two political commitments must be balanced or weighed in some way.
Although there are often reasonable disagreements as to how best to weigh
competing political values, certain weightings are simply unreasonable.112
Under the circumstances, the only reasonable way to balance the relevant
values is to grant priority to right of rights-respecting states to defend against
annihilative attacks. This is because, I speculate, we can reasonably demand
that ordinary human beings sacrifice only so much.113 Of course, this weighting
might not seem reasonable if we make that determination by relying on
our religious convictions: God has the right to demand far more of us by
way of sacrifice than it would otherwise be reasonable to demand.114 But
public officials cannot allow such controversial religious beliefs to determine
how best to balance the relevant conflicting political considerations.115 Absent
appeal to extraneous religious convictions, then, the only reasonable balance
of the relevant considerations is to affirm the permissibility of targeting
civilian non-combatants in the strictly delimited circumstances of a supreme
emergency.

view of public reason, citizens must vote for the ordering of political values they
sincerely think the most reasonable. Otherwise, they fail to exercise political
power in ways that satisfy the criterion of reciprocity.
RAWLS, supra note 79, at 168 (footnote omitted).
111. See id. at 94–99.
112. See RAWLS, supra note 108, at 49–50.
113. This is the key claim: it plays a decisive role in—what I speculate to be—
Rawls’s argument for the supreme emergency exemption. Perhaps Rawls hints at this in
the following passage: Although “in some circumstances a democratic people might better
accept defeat if the terms of the peace offered by the adversary were reasonable and
moderate, did not subject them to humiliation, and looked forward to a workable and
decent political relationship,” Nazism posed a “peculiar evil.” JOHN RAWLS, Fifty Years After
Hiroshima, in JOHN RAWLS: COLLECTED PAPERS 565, 569 (Samuel Freeman ed., 1999).
Given that peculiar evil, “under no conditions could Germany be allowed to win the war.”
Id. at 568. Ordinary human beings can reasonably be required to sacrifice only so much.
114. This for a number of reasons. For example, God might enable human beings to
fulfill moral demands that they would otherwise be unable to satisfy. God might compensate
human beings for their this-worldly sacrifices in the afterlife. It could be that friendship
with God is the greatest good available to human beings such that to comply with God’s
demands will always be conducive to a human being’s long-term flourishing. I am sure there
are many other possibilities.
115. See RAWLS, supra note 79, at 166, 168.
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Rawls’s assessment of religious critics of the British area bombing
campaign might seem to exemplify the way in which his understanding of
political liberalism excludes the transcendent from public life and in so doing
artificially constructs some vestigial sense of community.116 Consider in
this regard the implications of his understanding of the duties of a statesman
in political liberalism for a particular case. George Bell, the Bishop of Chichester,
was arguably the “only indisputably eminent English person to [voice] out
loud” principled opposition to the RAF’s bombing campaign.117 Even
though Bell was sincerely convinced that God Almighty, the Creator and
Sustainer of the Cosmos, is the judge who holds accountable both nations
and persons—even though that God forbids any human being under any
circumstance intentionally to take the life of any innocent person, and even
though Rawls was willing to grant that this doctrine was “intelligible”—
Rawls also seems committed to the proposition that Bell ought not have
allowed any such personal doctrine to prevent him from fulfilling “the
duties of the statesmen” as understood by “political liberalism.”118 And
116. See id. at 103–05.
117. Geoffrey Best, The Bishop and the Bomber, HIST. TODAY, Sept. 9, 1983, at 29, 31.
118. RAWLS, supra note 79, at 105. I think Rawls would have done better to focus
on Bishop Bell’s objection to the bombing campaign, rather than Anscombe’s—if for no
other reason than that Bell was actually a statesman. Bell was, and remains, a polarizing
figure. Churchill loathed him for his opposition to the RAF’s bombing campaign and
returned the favor by scuttling his post-war elevation to Archbishop of Canterbury. Michael
Burleigh construes him as vain, “in love with his self-image as a brave dissenter,” and
lacking in “common-sense realism.” MICHAEL BURLEIGH, MORAL COMBAT: GOOD AND
EVIL IN WORLD WAR II 504–05 (1st U.S. ed. 2011). But Basil Liddell Hart, a prominent
pre-war advocate of area bombing, regarded Bell as one of those “rare Churchmen in
history who have combined spirituality and statesmanship, both in high degree.” RONALD
C.D. JASPER, GEORGE BELL: BISHOP OF CHICHESTER 284–85 (1967). For Bishop Bell’s
address to the House of Lords on the area bombing campaign, see Bombing Policy, U.K.
PARLIAMENT (Feb. 9, 1944), https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/lords/1944/feb/09/
bombing-policy [http://perma.cc/BHK2-AFV8]. Here is one formulation of Bell’s objection to
area bombing, articulated at the onset of the war and before the beginning of the RAF’s
campaign:
When war breaks out, there is always a great marshalling of the nation’s
resources. The Church, which stands within the nation, is expected to express
solidarity with the nation. . . . What is the Church to do when there is a war?
We must insist on the distinction of functions. The Church has a specific
task to perform at all times. It owes it to the nation, as well as to itself, to discharge
that function to the best of its ability. If the Church has a function, war is not a
time when it should be abandoned.
But we must interpret further. There is first of the question of right and
wrong—the moral law. The Church, in the persons of its clergy, primarily
represents the Gospel which brings forgiveness and salvation. But it witnesses
also to eternal realties; and the moral law is both super-national and supernatural
as the Gospel is. The Church then ought to declare both in peace-time and wartime, that there are certain basic principles which can and should be the standards of
both international and social order and conduct. Such principles are the equal
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this, it seems, because his personal doctrine would prevent him from
endorsing a decision that, although murderous, was “reasonable in the
light of [a constitutional regime’s] political values.”119 What could this
be but to employ the conception of public reason as a basis for excluding
Bell’s appeal to the transcendent? Rawls’s assessment of Bell seems to
indicate that he is, if not a card-carrying member, then at least a functional
ally, of modern paganism.
VI.
I doubt that it is helpful, illuminating, or accurate to espy in recent
debates about public reason and religion a manifestation of the counterrevolutionary war between immanent and transcendent religion that Smith
hopes to reveal to us. Although I reject some of the core restrictions that
Rawls—or many Rawlsians—hope to impose on religious citizens and
statesmen, I do not believe that Rawls lines up on the side of modern
paganism and against transcendent religion. Though it is objectionable
on many counts, Rawlsian public reason liberalism is not objectionable
by virtue of its privileging the immanent over the transcendent sacred.
I would like to make three points in support of that judgment.
First, were he presented with Smith’s distinction between immanent
and transcendent religion, I think it a near certitude that Rawls would deny
any partiality in favor of either. So, for example, he explicitly asserts that
“political liberalism is sharply different from and rejects Enlightenment
Liberalism,”120 at least one manifestation of which would include the kind
of sacred-denying naturalism that plays a role, if a minor one, in Smith’s
account of the conflict between immanent and transcendent religion. He
also explicitly denies that public reasons are tantamount to secular reasons.121

dignity of all men, respect for human life, the acknowledgement of the solidarity
for good and evil of all nations and races of the earth . . . . It must not hesitate,
if occasion arises, to condemn the infliction of reprisals, or the bombing of
civilian populations, by the military forces of its own nation. It should set itself
against the propaganda of lies and hatred. It should be ready to encourage a
resumption of friendly relations with the enemy nation. It should set its face
against any war of extermination or enslavement, and any measure directly aimed
at destroying the morale of a population.
G.K.A. BELL, THE CHURCH AND HUMANITY (1939–1946), at 26–27 (1946).
119. RAWLS, supra note 79, at 105.
120. Id. at 176.
121. See id. at 146–48.
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If he explicitly distances political liberalism from both Enlightenment
Liberalism and secularism, then he would likely deny that political liberalism
is tantamount to, correlated with, or a functional ally of, modern paganism.
Of course, however, Rawls might be wrong about what his conception of
political liberalism implies.
Second, it seems clear that Rawls’s constraints on religious reasons,
when applicable, extend to both the immanent and transcendent sacred.122
Return again to the supreme emergency exception. As I noted, Rawls is
surprisingly unforthcoming as to any justification of that exception. In
that respect, he differs from Michael Walzer, who has written extensively
on just that topic. Walzer provides an explicitly communitarian rationale
for the exemption.123 If I understand him correctly, his conception of the
supreme emergency exemption extends to all communities that face an
existential threat from Nazi-like aggressors, and a crucial part of his
rationale for according that exemption has to do with the overriding value
to us of the communities that help to define our moral identities:
When our community is threatened, not just in its present territorial extension or
governmental structure or prestige or honor, but in what we might think of as its
ongoingness, then we face a loss that is greater than any we can imagine, except
for the destruction of humanity itself. We face moral as well as physical extinction,
the end of a way of life as well as of a set of particular lives, the disappearance of
people like us. And it is then that we may be driven to break through the moral
limits that people like us normally attend to and respect.124

Two features of this argument seem important. First, it seems to me at
least implicitly to justify the supreme emergency exemption by according
sacred value to our community.125 What is it to claim that a threat to our
community is to “face a loss that is greater than any we can imagine”126
other than to claim that our community our sacred? If I were to employ
the concept without employing the word, that is pretty much what I would
say. Second, Walzer’s appeal to the value of our community can satisfy
Rawls’s strictures on public reason no better, and no worse, than a comparable
appeal to some transcendent authority. Consider the following two propositions:
(1) We must obliterate one German city after another because doing so is
necessary to avoid “communal death,” and this is a loss greater than which none
can be imagined. (2) We cannot obliterate one German city after another because

122. See id. at 173; Michael Baur, On Actualizing Public Reason, 72 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2153, 2171 (2004).
123. See MICHAEL WALZER, ARGUING ABOUT WAR 45 (2004).
124. Id. at 43.
125. See id.
126. Id.
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that would require us to violate God’s authority, and this is a loss greater than
which none can be imagined.

Surely Rawls’s conception of public reason must apply to both if to either:
if (2) is an inappropriate basis for balancing the political values that
conflict in a supreme emergency, then so must (1). And so Rawls’s constraints
on nonpublic reasons apply to the immanent sacred: so long as the
justification of the supreme emergency exemption decisively depends on
an implicit appeal to the community as sacred, then that exemption lacks
the required public justification. Perhaps Rawls implicitly recognized that.
It seems significant that, although his conception of the just war tradition
largely follows Walzer’s treatment—and so he must have been aware of
Walzer’s communitarian argument for the supreme emergency exemption—
he does not avail himself of Walzer’s argument despite the fact that he
does not offer any other, compensatory rationale. And that is the point:
Rawls’s conception of public reason disciplines reasons that decisively
appeal to the immanent sacred no less than those that appeal to the
transcendent sacred.127 In short, debates about public reason and religion
do not map cleanly onto the conflict between pagans and Christians.
Third, not only would Rawls reject any partiality towards modern paganism,
and not only do his constraints on public reason apply to both the immanent
and transcendent sacred, but also those constraints are far weaker than
Smith seems to think. Smith’s explication of Rawls repeatedly employs
the language of “excluding,” “preclude” “inadmissible,” and “screening
out.”128 For example: “commitments and values deriving from transcendent
religion, formerly deemed respectable and legitimate in public discourse,
come to be excluded from the city’s own political decision making.”129
Again: “people whose deepest convictions (embodied in their ‘comprehensive
doctrines’) have been declared inadmissible in public discourse will
understandably feel excluded from public deliberations, and alienated
from the city governed by such deliberations.”130 And again: “Although
screening out the doctrines associated with a transcendent faith like
Christianity, however, ‘public reason’ would not preclude appeal to immanent

127.
128.
129.
130.

See RAWLS, supra note 79, at 173.
SMITH, supra note 1, at 334–35, 351, 353–54.
Id. at 334 (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 354.
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values of the kind favored by Ronald Dworkin and supported by his
‘religion without God.’”131
There is much in John Rawls’s corpus that lends itself to this exclusionary
interpretation. In his early understanding of political liberalism, Rawls
claims that the religious views that citizens naturally draw on to answer
fundamental political questions “should give way in public life” to principles
and values that “all citizens can endorse,” that religious doctrines “are not,
in general, to be introduced into political discussion of constitutional
essential and basic questions of justice,” and the like.132 But I think this
exclusionary understanding of Rawlsian public reason does not do it
justice. In its most mature formulation, Rawls’s constraints on religion,
whether immanent or transcendent, are quite mild. Perhaps too mild for
many Rawlsians. Smith mentions—though he does not discuss in detail—
Rawls’s so-called proviso—the idea that we may “introduce into political
discussion at any time our comprehensive doctrine, religious or nonreligious,
provided that, in due course, we give properly public reasons to support
the principles and policies our comprehensive doctrine is said to support.”133
At the very least, the proviso does not fit very well with Smith’s exclusionary
interpretation of Rawls—that it renders appeal to the transcendent “inadmissible
in public discourse.”134 Much to the contrary, the proviso allows public
discourse to be pervaded by justificatory appeals to the transcendent: in a
polity as pervasively religious as the United States continues to be—
despite some newspaper headlines here and there—we can expect citizens
who are committed to full compliance with the proviso to avail themselves
of its allowance that they may “introduce into political discussion at any
time [their] comprehensive doctrine, religious or nonreligious.”135 Moreover,
citizens who appeal to their faith in public discourse may be far more powerfully
motivated by their religious convictions than by any corroboratory public
reason they might, or might not, have. The proviso also allows for the
possibility that religious convictions, whether transcendent or immanent,
are causally decisive in the enactment of public policy. After all, if the
proviso allows citizens to be far more profoundly moved by their religious
convictions than by any corroboratory public reason, then it could be the
case that, as a matter of causal fact, the only way a certain policy is enacted
is that a sufficient number of citizens and legislators were motivated by

131. Id. at 351.
132. RAWLS, supra note 108, at 10, 15–16. Rawls’s view is broader than this: not
only religious but also moral and philosophical “comprehensive” views must give way.
Id.
133. RAWLS, supra note 79, at 144.
134. SMITH, supra note 1, at 354.
135. RAWLS, supra note 79, at 144.
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their religious reasons to support that policy. As I read it, the proviso is
quite undemanding indeed.
It is true that the permission “to introduce into political discussion at
any time our comprehensive doctrine, religious or nonreligious” is conditioned
by the provision “that, in due course, we give properly public reasons to
support the principles and policies our comprehensive doctrine is said to
support.”136 This might seem somewhat constricting, but it seems to me
to be quite a mild constraint indeed. Rawls explicitly refrains from specifying
what he means by “in due course”; it could mean a very long time. Ancient
Spartans would, I assume, have been utterly befuddled by a demand that
they refrain from exposing infants with Down Syndrome on the basis that
each human being has a dignity grounded on each’s being loved by God,
but many modern Spartans would find that practice abhorrent on the basis
that each human being has dignity, period. Sectarian religious doctrines
can become common moral sense. I imagine this is what many who take
advantage of the proviso’s conditional permission might think:
I support policy P on decisive religious grounds, and I have no idea how
to provide a corroboratory public rationale, but the proviso allows me to support
P anyway, so long as the corroboratory public rationale is eventually forthcoming,
which I am confident will be the case, since I have a theologically grounded belief
that eventually people will see the truth.137

136. Id.
137. At least some contemporary theorists who sympathize with Rawls understand
his proviso in so accommodating a manner that I cannot discern any serious, substantive,
or principled problems that remain. Consider, for example, Martha Nussbaum’s explication of
Rawls’s proviso:
In these revisions, Rawls has gone a very long way toward answering his religious
critics. In particular, Eberle’s critique is well accommodated, for the reasonable
citizen may now offer his or her religious reasons, continuing over time to pursue
a search for public reasons. All that is required is that the citizens have a conscientious
commitment to finding such reasons in due course and, perhaps, some degree of
confidence that this will ultimately be possible.
Martha C. Nussbaum, Introduction to RAWLS’S POLITICAL LIBERALISM 1, 39 (Thom Brooks &
Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 2015). I demur here only from Nussbaum’s “perhaps,” but the
differences here seem so insignificant as to be barely worth mentioning. It should hardly
be surprising that Nussbaum wonders whether some—I assume those sympathetic with
Rawls’s version of public reason liberalism—“may feel that Rawls has gone too far, in
that the plasticity of the proviso allows all sorts of religious appeals in politics, with no
clear way of showing that civility has been violated.” Id.; see also ROBERT AUDI, DEMOCRATIC
AUTHORITY AND THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 63–64 (2011). Understood as
mildly as Nussbaum does, it seems to me that neither the transcendently nor immanently
religious need to feel much excluded by Rawls’s proviso.
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In short, Rawls’s “in due course” provision seems to evacuate the proviso
of any actual normative bite. So it seems Rawls’s considered understanding
of political liberalism provides little if any comfort to those who aspire to
build community by way of excluding divisive appeals to religious truth
in public political deliberation.
VII.
I have tried to cast doubt on just two subthemes of Smith’s rendering of
the religious conflict between the immanent and transcendent sacred. In
both cases, I have indicated why Smith should revise his understanding of
the immanent side of that conflict. Modern paganism has far greater resources
for unifying a pluralistic population than Smith allows and public reason
liberalism, at least as understood by its most prominent proponent, does
not even implicitly or functionally take up the cudgel for immanent religion.
Of course, this hardly renders modern paganism immune from criticism.
Indeed, the incorporation of the communal into modern paganism might
well render it more troubling than the individualistic variation on which
Smith focuses. After all, a main way in which modern nation-states engender
unity amongst their diversely committed population is by waging war against
outsiders. Rawls’s adoption of the supreme emergency exemption to
legitimate the bludgeoning of German civilians during the Second World
War exemplifies just how troubling an immanent paganism that valorizes
the communal can be.
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